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Abstract 
 
This paper tests the hypothesis that the distance of a firm from the main financial centre affects 
underpricing positively. The higher is the distance the higher are the information imperfections 
among players involved in the Initial Public Offering and the higher is the uncertainty about the true 
value of the listing firm. Econometric results show that, in the Italian case, more distant firms from 
the financial centre are more underpriced. This finding holds in France but not in Germany 
suggesting that probably it is due to the spatial organization of the financial system. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The most extensively documented empirical regularity related to Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) is 
the underpricing: the shares of issuing companies are offered to investors at considerably lower 
prices than those they subsequently trade on the stock market. Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) 
report evidence that underpricing is relevant in every country and on average it is more than 15% in 
countries with developed financial system and around 60% in emerging markets.  
An important aspect of underpricing is that it can be thought as an indirect cost of raising equity 
finance.i The cost arises both in the case of primary equity offerings, via the dilution of the original 
shareholders’ stakes in the company, and in the case of secondary equity offerings, because the 
original shareholders could have sold theirs shares at a higher price. 
Several theories have been proposed to explain underpricing. In this work we empirically test the 
ex-ante uncertainty explanation proposed by Beatty and Ritter (1986) introducing a new proxy for 
the ex-ante uncertainty: the physical distance between issuing firms and the financial centre. We 
analyze the Italian case where we find a positive and significant relation between distance and 
underpricing. Therefore, the indirect cost of going public is greater for distant firms. Moreover, our 
results support the ‘Certification Hypothesis’ introduced by Booth and Smith (1986) and never 
tested on Italian case.  
Probably, the positive effect of distance on underpricing is due to the geographically centralized 
structure of Italian financial system. Then, we check if the result is still true in France and Germany. 
The comparison is particularly interesting given the fact that France has a centralized financial 
system, similar to Italy, while Germany has a spatially decentralized financial system.ii Estimates 
show that positive relation between distance and underpricing holds in France but not in Germany. 
 
2. Underpricing and Firms Localization 
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Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that there is a monotone relation between expected underpricing of 
an Initial Public Offering and the uncertainty of investors regarding its value. This uncertainty, that 
they define ex-ante uncertainty, is a proxy of asymmetric information among players involved in 
the IPO process. The authors demonstrate their proposition using the asymmetric information model 
introduced by Rock (1986). They assume that investors are uncertain about the value of the firm 
and that the issuing firm cannot make a credible commitment about its value because of moral 
hazard problem. Instead, the issuing firm must hire an underwriter that has the key function of 
avoiding the moral hazard problem and certificating that the IPO price correctly reflects the value of 
the firm and the potentially adverse inside information. This is what Boot and Smith (1986) call 
‘Certification Hypothesis’. In this framework financial markets are not perfect and the presence of 
market imperfections are relevant. Klagge and Martin (2005) suggest that in a spatially centralized 
system with a single financial centre asymmetric information, costly information and uncertainty 
may be a function of the physical distance between firms seeking finance and institutions providing 
finance. Moreover, some authors have shown that institutional investors are more likely to buy and 
hold stocks of firms that are located closer to the investors because the cost of information 
acquisition decreases with geographic proximity (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001). Malloy (2005) gave 
evidence of the fact that geographically proximate analysts are more accurate than others. These 
findings suggest that informational asymmetries increase with distance. Then, the ex-ante 
uncertainty about the value of the firms that go public, that is a proxy of asymmetric information, 
increases with firm distance from underwriters and investors (in particular institutional investors). 
Given that such operators, in a spatially centralized financial system, are located in the financial 
centre, more distant firms from financial centre will be more underpriced.  
 
3. Data, Model and Results 
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In our analysis we consider IPOs that took place in the Italian Stock Exchange between 1999 and 
2009. Only firms listing on the equity market for the first time are included in the sample.iii A total 
of 134 IPOs are considered.  
The Underpricing, our dependent variable, is  
( ) 100*
i
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SPU −=  
Where iP  is the closing price on the first day of trading and iS  is the subscription price.
iv
 Data to 
calculate Underpricing are those published by Borsa Italia SPA. Financial and other information 
about firms are those included in the IPO prospectus. Our proxy for ex-ante uncertainty is the 
variable Distance that measures the physical distance, in kilometers, between the legal headquarter 
of the firms and the city of Milano. The Italian financial centre is identified with the city of Milano 
where the only stock exchange, the headquarters of most important banks and almost all financial 
operators and institutional investors are located. We have also calculated the distance in terms of the 
necessary time to cover the physical distance.v In the model we include many control variables that 
previous studies have proposed as proxies for ex-ante uncertainty in order to check the relationship 
with underpricing. Firm’s size and age (variables Size and Age) have frequently been used to proxy 
investors’ ex-ante uncertainty. The larger and the older the firm, the lower is the uncertainty about 
its true value. Both variables have been computed as the natural logarithm. Reputation is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the underwriter has a good reputation on capital market and to zero 
otherwise. A testable implication of the ‘Certification Hypothesis’ is that the better is underwriter 
reputation the lower is the ex-ante uncertainty about the IPO and consequently the underpricing. 
There are several proxies in empirical literature for underwriter reputation. We use a dummy 
variable based on Carter and Manaster’s (1998) indicator. Range is a proxy for the uncertainty at 
the beginning of the IPO process and it is the price range from which the institutional investors 
express their interest in the issue. Many studies show that market sentiment affects the uncertainty 
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of IPOs. Then, we introduce the variables Index Return and Index Volatility in the model. Index 
Return is the percentage change in the Mib30 index in the twenty working days before the listing. If 
the market is bullish,  investors are induced to upgrade their estimation on the value of a firm. Index 
Volatility  is the standard deviation of the Mib30 index in the 60 working days before the listing. 
Volatility of the market increases the systematic risk and investor will be more careful in the 
evaluation of the IPO. Therefore, we expect a positive relation between market variables and 
underpricing. Both variables have been considered by Cassia et al. (2003) and the authors found a 
positive coefficient for the return of MIB 30 and a negative sign for the volatility of such index. The 
last proxy of ex-ante uncertainty that we add is Greenshoe, the ratio between the number of share 
dedicated to the greenshoe option and total number of share sold in the IPO. In order to support the 
share price during the first days of trading underwriters use the overallotment and greenshoe options 
in almost every Italian IPOs. Jenkinson and Jones (2007) point out that this procedure prevents a 
decline in price once stocks start trading and Benveniste and Spindt (1989) argue that greenshoe 
option reduces the risk of the issue, its uncertainty and the expected underpricing.  
Finally, we add two variables related to the bookbuilding method used in Italy in almost all IPOs 
since 1994. Revision is the revision of the issue price relative to the average value of the range 
price. It measures the amount of information that the underwriter has gathered in the roadshow. 
Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) use such variable and show that 
issues with positive revision in the offer price have greater underpricing.  
Oversubscription is the ratio between the number of institutional investors that have requested the 
share and the number of institutional investors that get the share. If the demand for the share is 
large, many investors will try to buy the shares in the aftermarket and this will affect positively the 
level of underpricing.  
The estimates of the factors that has determined underpricing in the period 1999-2009 are reported 
in Table 1.vi Column 1 shows that all coefficients have the expected sign, with the exception of the 
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variable Range. We expect a positive correlation with Underpricing but the coefficient is negative. 
However, the coefficient is not statistically significant. This result is similar to what found in other 
works. A reason could be that the range price is established six months before the day of the listing 
and in this period the underwriter could receive enough information to change its initial evaluation. 
All other coefficients are significant. The dummy for the underwriter reputation is significant with a 
negative sign as suggested by the ‘Certification Hypothesis’. Our proxy for the ex-ante uncertainty, 
the variable Distance, is significant at 1% level and shows a positive sign. This result corroborates 
our hypothesis that more distant firms from the financial centre experience a higher underpricing 
and so a higher indirect floatation cost. 
We also control our main result introducing sectorial dummy variables (Service Sector and 
Financial Sector) and the fees paid by the issuing firms to the underwriter (Fees) in the model. We 
use the Borsa Italia sectorial classification that allocates firms in industrial, service and financial 
sectors. Results are shown in column 2. The coefficients of sectorial dummies are significant with 
positive signs, meaning that the financial and service firms are more underpriced than industrial 
firms. The variable Fees, that is the direct cost of going public, has a positive correlation with 
Underpricing, excluding that high underpricing could be balanced by lower fees. Variable Distance 
is robust to these checks and it is still significant at 1% level.vii 
Finally, for international comparison, we estimate a restricted model for Germany and France.viii In 
other countries, like Germany and France, the IPO process is partially different from the Italian case 
and many variables are not computable.ix French financial centre is Paris and German is Frankfurt.x 
Market Index are Cac40 for France and Dax30 for Germany. PIPOs and ECOs are excluded from 
the sample and only firms listing for the first time are considered. In order to compare the results we 
estimate the restricted model also for Italy (column 3). Econometric results do not change and the 
impact of Distance remains the same. The positive relationship between Underpricing and Distance 
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is still true in France (column 4) but not in Germany (column 5). This may be due to the 
geographically centralized structure of Italian and French financial system. 
 
Table 1. Determinants of underpricing in Italy, France and Germany (1999-2009) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Distance 0.019*** 
(0.006) 
0.021*** 
(0.006) 
0.021*** 
(0.008) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.013 
(0.012) 
Revision 6.75*** 
(2.42) 
6.93*** 
(2.54)    
Size -0.83** 
(0.34) 
-0.52 
(0.37) 
-1.01*** 
(0.33) 
0.36 
(0.23) 
-2.05** 
(0.91) 
Age -3.52** 
(1.47) 
-2.44* 
(1.39) 
-2.69* 
(1.45) 
-0.22 
(0.45) 
-3.91** 
(1.79) 
Index Return 0.92** 
(0.40) 
1.04** 
(0.45) 
1.15** 
(0.57) 
0.19*** 
(0.08) 
0.34 
(0.46) 
Index Volatility 0.016* 
(0.009) 
0.016* 
(0.01) 
0.015* 
(0.008) 
0.02*** 
(0.006) 
0.11*** 
(0.021) 
Reputation -6.63** 
(2.59) 
-6.11** 
(2.67)    
Greenshoe -072** 
(0.33) 
-0.65** 
(0.31)    
Oversubscription  9.95* 
(5.99) 
10.85* 
(5.85)    
Range -0.34 
(0.04) 
-0.038 
(0.045)    
Service Sector 
 
5.07* 
(2.90) 
3.79 
(3.05) 
-2.82*** 
(0.96) 
7.18 
(5.61) 
Financial Sector 
 
6.89** 
(2.80) 
7.5** 
(3.38) 
1.04 
(1.55) 
-9.75*** 
(4.05) 
Fees 
 
2.32* 
(1.31)    
Constant 14.11 
(9.78) 
1.62 
(9.56) 
11.73** 
(5.69) 
-5.20 
(4.01) 
34.39** 
(16.49) 
R2 0.4656 0.5014 0.2755 0.0786 0.1606 
F-statistic 12.36 12.56 2.8 3.78 7.03 
Observations 134 124 134 332 308 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Our empirical analysis shows that in Italy the underpricing is greater for the firms localized far 
away from the financial centre. Since in literature underpricing is considered the main indirect 
flotation cost, our ‘Localization Hypothesis’ means that the cost of equity is greater for the distant 
firms. In Italy we also found empirical evidence of the ‘Certification Hypothesis’. This finding 
corroborates the theory that explains the underpricing in the context of asymmetric information and 
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ex-ante uncertainty. International comparison shows that positive relationship between underpricing 
and distance holds in France but not in Germany. This suggests that probably the result is due to the 
centralized structure of the Italian and French financial systems. Further studies would be needed to 
corroborate ours results.  
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i
 IPO process involves both direct costs (underwriting and audit fees, selling commission, legal expanses, etc.) and 
indirect costs. Underpricing is considered the larger indirect cost. 
ii
 Frankfurt is the main financial centre whit the major stock exchange. Moreover there are several regional financial 
centres whit their own stock exchange and large concentration of regional banks and other financial institutions. 
iii
 Privatization Initial Public Offerings (PIPOs) and Equity Curve Outs (ECOs) are excluded from the sample because 
they are less risky than independent IPOs. Pagano et al. (1998) identify a significant difference between the factors 
underlying the decision to go public taken by PIPOs, ECOs and independent firms. Also foreign firms are excluded 
(firms that not have their own legal headquarter in Italy). 
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iv
 We also compute market adjusted underpricing as difference between underpricing and the change in the market 
index during the first day of trading. Estimates with market adjusted underpricing and raw underpricing are very 
similar. 
v
 The variable shows a high positive correlation whit the variable Distance then we use only the last one. Moreover if 
we introduce in the model Regional Dummies their coefficients are not significant. 
vi
 OLS estimates are adjusted for heteroschedasticity using White (1980) covariance matrix. 
vii
 As further check we estimate a model in which regional variables (gdp, R&D expenditure, coefficients of sectorial 
specialization, etc.) are included as regressors. The results are not statistically significants.  
viii
 Underpricing and market variables are calculated using Nyse-Euronext and Deutsche Boerse Group official data. 
Information about firms are collected from IPO prospectus. 
ix
 While in Italy all IPOs are conducted with the bookbuilding procedure in Germany and France many IPOs have been 
floated using different methodologies (minimum price, fixed price. etc). 
x
 Taking into account that in Germany there are many regional stock exchanges we calculate the variable Distance in 
two different way: both from the main stock exchange (Frankfurt) and from the closer stock exchange to the listing 
firm. Econometric results not change regardless of what method we use. 
